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I INTRODUCTION 
Megan Kanka was a seven year old girl who had lived her short life in a quiet, 
suburban township in New Jersey, America. On 29 July 1994, Megan was lured into her 
neighbour's home, less than 30 metres from where she lived. A short time later, Jesse 
Timmendequas, a convicted, repeat sex offender who had already served six years in 
prison for assault and attempted sexual assault on another child, raped and murdered 
Megan .1 Megan' s parents had been prevented from knowing Jesse's history because the 
position taken by the State of New Jersey favoured Jesse's right to privacy over their 
daughter's safety. New Jersey has subsequently changed its laws, allowing for public 
notification of convicted sex offenders. In contrast, New Zealand continues to prioritise 
sex offenders' privacy over the public's right to freedom of information and protection, 
by not allowing for the public release of sex offender information. Instead, strict rules 
relating to the release of sex offender infonnation are provided for under the police 
Criminal Profiling Guidelines.2 
In 2003, ACT MP Deborah Coddington sought to alter this position by 
introducing the Sex Offenders Registry Bill 20033 to Parliament. The Bill proposed to 
implement a state-run, non-publicly accessible register (non-public register) of sexual 
offenders in New Zealand. It was advocated that the Bill would assist in the deteITence, 
investigation and prevention of future sexual offending. However, with the rejection of 
the Sex Offenders Registty Bill, the New Zealand Parliament has deemed that the 
consequential negative effects of a register listing sexual offender infonnation would 
outweigh the benefits proposed by its implementation. 4 In doing so , Parliament has 
effectively given prominence to an offender's right to privacy over the public's right to 
freedom of info1mation and protection. This paper considers whether the New Zealand 
position is justifiable in today' s free and democratic society, or whether the public's right 
to infonnation and protection and the potential benefits of a register necessitate change. 
1 Megan Nico le Kanka Fo unda tion www. meganni co lekankafo undation.o rg/miss io n.htm (accessed 2 1 May 
2008). 
2 Mini stry o f Justice Guidelines on Crim inal Pm.filing (M inistry of Jus tice, Wellington, 1993). 3 Sex Offend ers Reg isb·y Bill , no 36- 1. 
4 Hon Phill Go ff and Na ndor Tanczos, (30 Jul y 2003) 6 10 NZPD 7494. 
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Pait II of this paper outlines the present approach to sex offender registration in 
New Zealand, and concludes that a state-run register is needed , as the cun-ent situation is 
not adequate. Patt III then outlines the conflicting rights to p1ivacy and freedom of 
expression in New Zealand, and concludes that both rights need to be given an equal 
weighting when they come into conflict. Patt IV examines approaches in foreign 
jurisdictions in relation to sex offender registers and evaluates how the conflict between 
the competing rights to ptivacy and freedom of expression is overcome in the respective 
jurisdictions. It concludes that a register can be successfully implemented 
notwithstanding the competing 1ights to freedom of expression and p1ivacy. Pait V then 
considers the underlying competing policy concerns behind sex offender registration and 
dete1mines that only the implementation of a non-public register would address the policy 
rationales behind a sex offender register. A non-public register is therefore recommended 
for New Zealand. Patt VI accordingly proposes a register for New Zealand and, drawing 
on the expe1ience of overseas jurisdictions, identifies the characteristics such a register 
should have. Finally, Pait VII considers whether the proposed register could survive in 
New Zealand's legal climate. This paper concludes that a non-public register would 
survive in New Zealand, and despite Pat·liament's concerns in 2003 , a non-public register 
could in fact be implemented without the adverse consequences anticipated, and without 
unjustifiably breaching an offender's right to privacy. 
II SEX OF FENDER REGISTRATION IN NEW ZEALAND TODAY 
A What are sex offender registers? 
For the purposes of this paper, a sex offender register is a database containing 
infonnation about persons who have been convicted of specific sexual offences. 
Infonnation contained on a register can range simply from an offender's name and 
offence, to DNA samples, photographs, addresses, travel plans and an offender's modus 
operandi. The purposes of registration include facilitating the investigation, prevention 
and deterrence of future sexual offending. 
To achieve these purposes, different approaches to administering registers are 
taken among vat·ious jurisdictions. Sex offender registers may be run officially by the 
8 
State, or privately by individuals, interest groups or organisations. This paper will focus 
on state-run registers, although mention is made of privately-managed sex offender 
registers in the United States, and the sex offender database nm by the Sensible 
Sentencing Trust in New Zealand. 
Within the category of state-run registers, one may fmther divide sex offender 
registers into three sub-catego1ies. First, registers may be completely open to the public 
(whether by internet or by provision of infonnation upon request), as is the position in 
certain jurisdictions in the United States. Secondly, registers may be non-public, but 
allowing for the dissemination of information to certain members of the public on a 
controlled basis. Under these semi-public registers, information may be disclosed to 
certain officials, teachers and members of the public based on an assessment of risk to 
public safety. This type of register has been implemented in the United Kingdom and 
certain provinces in Canada. Finally, registers may be entirely non-public, as in Australia. 
That is, info1mation contained in the register may only be accessed by police, 
probationaiy officers and ce11ain other authorised persons. This paper proposes that New 
Zealand adopt a state-run, non-public register, with the ability of police to disseminate 
info1mation to certain members of the public based on an assessment of risk. 
B Publication of sex offender information by the State 
1 Police Criminal Profiling Guidelines 
In New Zealand, the police C1iminal Profiling Guidelines allow for limited 
disclosure of info1mation concerning active, persistent c1iminals who are cun-ently 
engaged in significant offending.5 The release of such infonnation is strictly controlled , 
and must only be pe1mitted if the offender is currently engaged in continuing criminal 
offending serious enough to justify the release of information. It is also necessa1y that 
releasing the information is believed to reduce or bring about a cessation of the 
offending. 6 As a result, the cun-ent release of information is strictly controlled, and 
information cannot be disclosed solely on the basis that an offender poses a danger to 
5 Guidelin es on Criminal Pr(?filing , abo ve n 2. 
6 Tb id, guideline 3. 
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members of society. As will be detailed below, release of sex offender infonnati
on not in 
accordance with the Guidelines can result in liability under the to11 of breach of p
rivacy.
7 
2 Proposed state-run register 
There is currently no official state-run sex offender register (either public or no
n-
public) which collates information on sexual offenders for the purpose of inve
stigation, 
prevention and deterrence of future sexual offending. One attempt to introduc
e such a 
register was made with the introduction of the Sex Offenders Registry Bill (th
e Bill) to 
Parliament in 2003. The purpose of the Bill was to establish a non-public ,
 national 
database of sex offenders (accessible by the police and any person authorise
d by the 
Minister of Justice) to assist the police in their investigation of sexual offen
ces.8 The 
database ain1ed to list three groups of offenders: persons convicted of a sexua
l offence 
under the Crimes Act 1961 ; 
9 those found not guilty by reason of insanity who still 
presented a danger to the public ; and those cautioned by the police.
10 The register was to 
include: an offender's name; address; sexual offences committed; and other id
entifying 
info1mation, including any photographs, DNA and fingerprints available .
11 
Despite the Attorney-General's affirmation that the Bill was not inconsistent wi
th 
the rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the
 Bill was 
ultimately not passed , largely due to criticisms made by the New Zealand Law
 Society 
(and accepted by the Justice and Electoral Select Committee) that the Bill was 
too wide 
in scope and potentially allowed too many people access to infonnation on the r
egister. 
12 
Consequently, the Justice and Electoral Select Committee concluded that the B
ill would 
not achieve its intended purpose in its proposed form, and recommend that the B
ill not be 
passed.
13 As a result, there remains no fonnal state-run scheme for the collation of sex
 
7 See Pait VII, para A , p 4 7 for an applicati on o f th e tort o f pri vacy to the re lease
 o f information under th e 
P olice Criminal Profilin g Guide lines in the case o f Brown v Attorn ey-Genera! [2006] D
CR 630 . 
8 Sex Offend ers Registry Bill , above n 3, cl 3. 
9 Ibid, c l 4. 
IO Ibid , c l 5. 
11 Ibid, cl 8. 
12 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee Sex Offenders Registry Bill Report of the Ju
stice and Electoral 
Committee (36-1, We lling ton, 2003) . Anyone proclaiming the des ire to reduce sexua l o
ffending co uld 
have access to th e reg ister . 
11 l b id . 
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offender information in New Zealand for the purposes of investigation, prevention and 
deterrence of future sexual offending. 
C Publication of sex offender information by individuals 
As an alternative to a non-public, state-run register in New Zealand , the Sensible 
Sentencing Trust administers an informal , public website of paedophiles and sexual 
offenders. 14 The website lists the details of known sex offenders , including their name, 
age, photograph, offences, victims, affiliations and current location. The website is not 
known for its neutrality and it specifically acknowledges that it may contain mistakes or 
etTOrs.15 One must ask, if Parliament deems that it is not appropriate to have a non-public, 
state-managed register, is this public, unregulated alternative justifiable? This paper will 
demonstrate that such public registers are not in fact justifiable, and will conclude that 
New Zealand should implement a state-run, non-public register as a justifiable 
alternative . 
III NEW ZEALAND- THE LAW 
A Freedom of expression 
I Theories underly ing the right to freedom of express ion 
Underlying the right to freedom of expression are four generally accepted theories 
as to the impo1iance of free speech. First, freedom of expression is said to allow citizens 
to attain a sense of self-fulfilment and autonomy, as individuals seek fulfilment through 
expression.16 Secondly, free speech helps social stability in that it provides an outlet for 
hostility. In this regard, freedom of speech may promote social tolerance. 17 Thirdly, free 
speech and free trade in ideas allows society to discover the trnth from a 'marketplace of 
ideas' , as it is believed that the truth will emerge from a contest of ideas .18 Fou1ihly, it is 
advocated that protection of free speech promotes the advancement and maintenance of 
democratic self-government, as it is through free expression that citizens may influ ence 
14 Sensible Sentenc ing Trust www.sa fe-nz.o rg .nz (accessed 2 l May 2008). 
15 Ibid . 
16 Thomas I Emerson The system a/freedom ofe..xpression, (Rando m house, N ew York , 1970) 6. 17 fbid ,7 . 
18 
See, fo l' exa mple, Abrams v United States (1919) 250 U 6 16,630, in which Ho lmes J stated in di ssen t 
that " the ultimate good des ired is better reached by free trade in ideas- that the best test o f truth is th e 
power o f the tho ught to ge t itself accepted in th e co mpetition o f the marke t". Justi ce Ho lmes' 
marke tplace o f ideas theo ry draws insp ira tion fro m the views of Jo hn Milton and John Stewart Mill. 
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governmental policy and hold representatives accountable. 
19 Indeed, such is the 
impo1tance of freedom of expression to a democratic government that it has 
been 
protected by comts even in the absence of a legislative iight.
20 
These theories underlying the right to freedom of expression may be used to 
promote the implementation of a sex offender register. First, the maintenance of
 a sex 
offender register may promote citizens' autonomy, as they can ca1Ty out their 
lives 
without the unnecessary apprehension that they are at risk of unknown sex offe
nders 
within their community. By releasing sex offender info1mation, citizens may be a
ble to 
better protect themselves, the absence of publicity presenting an offender wi
th an 
oppo1tunity to re-offend if they remain anonymous to the public. 
21 Fmthermore, by 
focusing greater public attention on sexual offending, a register may in fact pro
mote 
social tolerance, as citizens can discuss the issues in relation to sexual offending and
 vent 
any hostility that they may have. Finally, those claiming a community entitleme
nt to 
information claim that the absence of publicity may cause suspicion to fall upon o
thers 
and believe that the public should be made aware of the identities of the sex offend
ers in 
their community. This argument highlights the importance of striving for tmth. 
2 Legislative protection of the right to freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression, manifested in section 14 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA), gives citizens the freedom to "seek, receive and i
mpart 
info,mation."
22 Proponents of a register identify their right to "seek" information about 
sex offenders and "receive" that infonnation from the State. Although the rig
ht to 
freedom of expression is recognised as of "central imp011ance in a democratic sta
te",23 
19 See, for example, New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254. 
20 Despite no constitutional protection ofa right to expression , the High Court of A
ustralia has held that a 
'freedom of communication' in regard to political matters can be infen-ed from 
the concept of democratic 
government mentioned in the Australian Constitution. 
21 JB Robe11son ( ed) Adams on Criminal law (Brooker and Friend, Wellington, 1992) 3
-43. 
22 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. This freedom is also encapsulated in the Inter
national 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , A
rt 19 .2 , which states: 
"everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall inc
lude the freedom to seek, 
receive and impa11 information". 
23 
Geoffrey Palmer (Minister of Justice) A Bill of Rights/or Neiv Zealand, A White Pape
r (PD Hasselberg 
Government P1inter, Wellington , 1985) 79. 
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this freedom is not absolute. Section 5 of the NZBORA states that freedom of expression 
may be subject to limitations which are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.24 The public's right to seek and receive sex offender information may therefore 
be restricted in so far as is reasonable to protect a countervailing right or interest. In this 
context, the countervailing right or interest is an offender's right to privacy. 
In the case of Hosking v Runting, the Court of Appeal considered whether 
recognising a to11 of privacy would be consistent with the right to freedom of expression 
affirmed in the NZBORA. 25 The Court held that freedom of expression must 
accommodate other values which society sees as important and found that the existence 
of the tort of privacy was indeed such a value.26 Therefore, a restriction on the right to 
freedom of expression based on the protection afforded to individuals under the to11 of 
breach of privacy is consistent with the guarantees contained in the NZBORA. 
B Tort of breach of privacy 
1 The nature of privacy protection 
Some commentators have dismissed privacy as an indefinable and unintelligible 
concept that is incapable of legal protection.27 The most renowned definition of privacy is 
"the 1ight to be left alone",28 however, the inherent vagueness of such a definition has led 
to an abundance of different formulations attempting to encapsulate the legal right to 
privacy.29 Of the many different fo1mulations of privacy, the relevant concept in relation 
to the release of sex offender information involves informational privacy (as opposed to 
physical p1ivacy). That is, an individual's ability to control the circulation, dissemination 
and access of info,mation relating to themselves. 30 
24 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990 , s 5 . 
25 Hosking v Run ting [2005] I NZLR I (CA). 
26 Ibid , 56, Tipping J. 
27 Geoffrey Palmer "Privacy and the Law" [1 975] NZLJ 747 , 748 . 
28 Samuel Wa1Ten and Loui s Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 1-larv L Rev 193. 
29 "Privacy and the Law", above n 27. 
30 Law Co mmiss ion "Privacy concepts and issues: rev iew o f the law o f privacy stage I " (January 2008, 
Wellington) 57. 
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2 Legislative protection of privacy 
Although there is no general right to privacy in New Zealand le
gislation, various 
statutes do afford specific protections which relate to aspects of
 piivacy.
31 
Most notably, 
the P1ivacy Act 1993 provides guidelines relating to the disclosure o
f private information 
by the State and its agencies. However, sex offenders will be
 unable to challenge the 
legitimacy of a register under the P1ivacy Act, primarily becaus
e section 7 provides that 
"nothing in ... principle 11 [the disclosure principle] derogates from 
any provision that is 
contained in any enactment and that authorises or requires pe
rsonal infonnation to be 
made available."
32 Thus, as a sex offender register would be established by legis
lation, 
the disclosure p1inciple contained in the Privacy Act would not 
provide any protection to 
offenders. 
The tight to privacy is also protected by A1ticle 17 of the Intern
ational Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), which stipulates:
33 
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer
ence with his privacy, 
family, home, or co1Tespondence, nor to unlawful attacks o
n his honour and 
reputation. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law again
st such interference or 
attacks. 
However, the protection offered by Alticle 17 only extends to
 arbitrary, unlawful and 
false attacks on an individual's honour and reputation.
34 As any info1mation contained in 
a register would be verified and legally obtained, the protection 
afforded under Article 17 
of the ICCPR would not extend to the disclosure of such infon
nation on the grounds of 
false or unlawful attacks. Fu1them1ore, disclosure of informati
on from a register could 
not be considered arbitrary, as infomrntion would only be disc
losed in accordance with 
31 See generally: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21; Priva
cy Act 1993; Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4. 
See also Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (3ed, Brookers, W
ellington , 200 I) 911. 
12 P1ivacy Act 1993 , s 7. 
33 international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 Decemb
er 1966) 999 UNTS 171 , art 17. See 
also, Universal Declaration of I Iuman Rights, UNGA Resolution
 217 A (III) ( I O December 1948), a11 12 , 
which protects privacy to a similar degree. 
14 
Jae Lemin The PriFacy LalV Implications of the 1996 Paedophile and S
ex Offender index (LLB Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997) 4. 
14 
set rules and procedures. Thus, disclosure would not be the result of random choices or 
personal whim based on wide discretion, but would be strictly regulated. 
Although the NZBORA does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy, it does 
not follow that a right to privacy does not exist in New Zealand law. This is evidenced by 
section 28 of the NZBORA, which provides that an existing right or freedom is not 
abrogated or restricted because it is not included or fully included in the NZBORA. It is 
understood that privacy was not included in the NZBORA because it was not an 
established right in New Zealand at the time NZBORA was introduced. This is 
recognised in the White Paper Commentary of NZBORA, which identified privacy as "a 
right that is not by any means fully recognised ... which is in the course of development, 
and whose boundaries would be uncertain and contentious." 35 For that reason, the next 
section will consider the protection afforded to privacy under the tort of breach of 
p1ivacy, which has developed in common law to become a recognised cause of action in 
New Zealand. 
3 Common law protection of privacy 
While the common law has traditionally protected p1ivacy interests through , for 
example, the torts of trespass and equitable breach of confidence,36 Tucker v News Media 
Ownership was the first case to acknowledge that an independent legal 1ight to ptivacy 
did in fact exist in New Zealand,37 although in that case McGechan J made it clear that 
this acknowledgment was given with "caution and hesitation."38 Seven years later, Gallen 
J in Bradley v Wingnut Films accepted that "such a cause of action forms pai1 of the law 
of this countiy".39 While there is a collection of eai·ly case law that cont1ibuted to the 
fo1mation of the New Zealand tort of breach of privacy,40 it was the case of Hosking v 
Runting41 that established the cmTent common law approach used by cou11s. 
35 A Bill of Rights fo r New Zealand, A White Pap er, above n 23, 104. 
36 Todd, above n 31 , 911 . P1i vacy interes ts were al so protec ted through the to rts o f nuisance, de fam ation 
and intentional infliction o f emo tional dis tress. 
37 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 7 16. 
38 Ibid , 732-3 McGechan J. 
39 Bradley v Wingnut Film s [1993] 1 NZLR 415 , 423 Gall en J . 
4o See generally: Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] I NZLR 41 5; P v D [2000] 2 NZLR; and L v G [2002) 2 
NZ LR 59 1. 
4 1 Hosking" Runting, above n 25. 
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According to the Hosking majority, in order to establish liability under the to11 of 
breach of privacy, the plaintiff must prove :
42 
(!) The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of 
p1ivacy; and 
(2) Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person. 
However, publication will not constitute a breach if the defendant can prove that there is 
a legitimate public concern in the information.
43 The Hosking formulation of the tort of 
breach of privacy has since been applied and successfully relied upon in a situation where 
information concerning a sexual offender has been released to the public.
44 
Consequently, 
the tort of breach of privacy is an obstacle that will need to be overcome before a sex 
offender register can be implemented in New Zealand. 
C Which interest to prevail? 
There are at least two possible views about the balancing of the right to freedom 
of information and the tight to protection against a breach of ptivacy. One view is that, 
because freedom of information is expressly guaranteed in the NZBORA, it is a p1imary 
value in relation to interests that are excluded, such as p1ivacy. The other view is that, 
although not expressly included in the NZBORA, p1ivacy is neve11heless an existing right 
of equal standing. This is in accordance with section 28 of the NZBORA, which provides 
that an existing right or freedom is not abrogated or restricted simply because it is not 
included or fully included in the Act. Each of these views is advocated in the cases of 
Brooker v Police and Hosking v Run ting. 
A recent development concerning the respective imp011ance of these rights was 
explored in the case of Brooker v Police. 
45 While the majority treated freedom of 
expression as a right of fundamental impo11ance, they considered privacy to be a mere 
value. Rights were considered to have a dominant status, the 'non-tight' having to be 
42 Ibid , para 11 7 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
43 Ibid , para 129 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
44 Brown v Attorney-General, above n 7. 
45 Brooker v Police (2007] 3 NZLR 91. 
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justified as a reasonable limit on the right.46 Accordingly, those endorsing public registers 
argue that restricting the right to receive infonnation to the extent that the public may not 
receive information on a sexual offender living in their community (due to the offender's 
1ight to privacy) is an unreasonable limitation on the right to freedom of expression. This 
was the view of the minority in Hosking , which did not accept that privacy could be a 
justified limitation on free speech under section 5 of the NZBORA.47 
In contrast, Thomas J for the minority in Brooker asse11ed that both freedom of 
expression and privacy should be recognised as fundamental values and accorded neither 
presumptive nor paramount status.48 This reasoning is in accordance with the case of 
Hosking, in which Tipping Jin the majority did not consider that "omission from the Bill 
of Rights Act can be taken as a legislative rejection of privacy as [a] ... fundamental 
value."49 Indeed, Tipping J even considered that p1ivacy could outweigh the right to 
freedom of expression in ce11ain circumstances.so A recent Law Commission study also 
lends support to this position, as it suggests that a proper weighting of freedom of 
expression and privacy should be given in the particular circumstances in which they 
arise, rather than a general mle classifying the relative importance of each value.s 1 It is 
submitted that this view is correct, and for that reason, in cases where the rights to 
freedom of expression and privacy conflict, neither should have paramount status, each 
right being weighed in light of the pai1icular circumstances of the case. 
IV THEO VERSEAS EXPERIENCE 
Before detennining whether it would be justifiable to implement a sex offender 
register in New Zealand in the face of the competing rights to p1ivacy and freedom of 
expression, it is helpful to examine registers implemented in other ju1isdictions, and 
evaluate how these other jurisdictions overcome the conflict between the competing 
rights. This section will provide an overview of sex offender legislation implemented in 
46 Ibid , para 40 Eli as CJ. 
47 Hosking v Run ting, above n 25, para 222 Ke ith J. 
48 Brooker v Police, above n 45 , para 164 Thomas J. 
49 Hosking v Runting, above n 25 , para 92 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
50 Ibid , para 237 Tipping J. 
51 "Pri vacy concepts and iss ues: rev iew o f th e law o f privacy stage I ", above n 30 , 68. 
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the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. It will th
en examine the 
protection afforded to the rights to privacy and freedom of expression 
in each country, 
before detennining how the different jurisdictions resolve conflict
s between the 
competing rights. This analysis will provide a useful background for det
ermining how a 
sex offender register could survive in the face of the competing rights
 to privacy and 
freedom of expression in New Zealand. 
A United States 
1 Public registers 
The United States first obligated all States to implement public sex 
offender 
registers in 1994, under the Jacob Wetterling Act
52 (a federal statute). Subsequently, all 
States in Ametica have legislated to require sex offenders to register with
 police. In 2007, 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
53 established a national sex offender 
register. Information from the register is released to the public based on 
the level of risk 
the offender poses to society. Information on level 1 (low-risk) offenders may
 be released 
to other enforcement agencies, while info1mation on level 2 (moderate
-risk) offenders 
may be made available to schools, neighbours and community g
roups. Finally, 
infotmation on level 3 (high-1isk) offenders may be disclosed to the publ
ic through press 
releases and fliers. Controversially, as well as the controlled release
 of information 
through State registers, there has been a proliferation of p1ivately manag
ed internet sites 
allowing any individual in the United States to search for sex offenders
 living in his or 
her area, and obtain access to info1mation such as an offender's nam
e, age, address, 
photograph and conviction details. 
Info1mation kept on state registers varies amongst the United States juris
dictions, 
with most registers containing an offender's name, age, address , photogra
ph, fingerprints 
and conviction details. Some state registers additionally require an offe
nder's residence 
history, vehicle registration, blood samples, DNA, social security num
ber and modus 
52
JacobWetle rlingAct 13 6 Vl USC~ 1407 1. 
53 Adam Wa lsh Child Protection and Sa fe ty Act (Pub L l 09-248). 
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operandi. Infonnation is kept on registers for varying periods of time, with all States 
requiring at least 10 years , and some requiring lifetime registration. 
In 1996, the United States Supreme Com1 reviewed the constitutionality of sex 
offender registers in the case of Kansas v Hendricks. The majority upheld the 
constitutionality of the Kansas sex offender register, although in a close 5-4 decision. 54 
The Court ruled that as the register was civil in nature and did not establish 'criminal' 
proceedings, involuntary confinement pursuant to the statute was not punitive, and as a 
result, its implementation did not constitute punishment (thus precluding any :finding of 
double jeopardy or ex post facto violation). The legality of the public registers was also 
affirmed by the United States Supreme Com1 in 2002 in Connecticut Dept. of Public 
Safety v Doe, in which a sex offender register was challenged on the grounds that it 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, because registrants were not 
afforded a pre-deprivation hearing to dete1mine whether they were likely to be "currently 
dangerous". The Court held that due process did not entitle an offender to a hearing to 
prove a fact (that is, whether the offender was dangerous or not) which was not material 
under the relevant statute.55 
2 Protection afforded to privacy interests 
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly mention any right to 
privacy, support for such a right has been derived from the First, Fourth , Ninth and 
Fom1eenth Amendments.56 The United States is now regarded as having a well developed 
privacy law, with the right to privacy being recognised in vi11ually all jurisdictions of the 
country. 57 William Prosser, in hi s seminal ai1icle "Privacy", 58 surveyed common law 
protections of privacy in the United States and found not just one tol1 protecting privacy 
54 Kansas v Hendricks 521 US 346, 357, 11 7 SCt 2072 (1997). 
55 Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v Doe (2003) 27 1 F3 d 38 SC. To the author's knowledge, sex 
o ffender reg isters have never been chall enged on the grounds of a breach o f the to,t of privacy in the 
United States . 
56 Roe v Wade (1973) 41 0 US 113 . T he concept o f privacy in the United States has been invoked to strik e 
down abo,tion laws, prohibitions on the sa le of contraceptives to man-i ed couples ( Griswold v Connecit11 t 
( 1965) 38 1 US 4 79) and anti-sodomy laws (Lawrence v Texas (2003) 539 US 558). 
57 See, fo r ex ample, Carr v Wa tk ins [1 962] 227 Md 578, 177 A2d 84 1; and T111xes v Kenco Enterprises Inc 
[ 1963] 80 SD 104, 11 9 N W 2d 9 14. 
58 William Prosser "Privacy" ( 1960) 48 Cal IR 383. 
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interests, but four different privacy interests afforded to individuals: intrusion up
on the 
seclusion or solitude of another; public disclosure of private facts; publicity that
 places 
another in a false light; and approp1iation of another's nan1e or likeness for one
's own 
advantage.59 However, these torts protecting breaches of privacy have proved to
 be of 
limited effect, due to the constitutionally entrenched 1ight to freedom of express
ion, as 
explored below. 
3 Freedom of expression 
The right to freedom of expression is given express legislative recognition in the
 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees: "Congres
s shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech". This right is absolute, and cont
ains no 
provision subjecting it to any justifiable limitations. The United States Supreme
 Court 
balances free speech and other rights on the basis of principles it has developed o
ver the 
last centu1y. If these principles are found 'compelling', or in some circum
stances 
'substantial', they may justify restrictions on the exercise of speech iights.
60 However, all 
principles are designed to give free speech more protection than it would enjoy i
f courts 
were to afford freedom of speech and competing interests equal impo1tance 
in the 
balancing process. Thus, there is a strong presumption in favour of free speech. 
4 Conflicts and resolution 
Ame1ican courts have tended to take an abstract approach to the balancing of
 
privacy and free speech interests. Such an approach proceeds by deciding which
 of the 
two interests is of greater impo1tance in society generally. The more importan
t value 
( usually taken to be freedom of speech) is then given pre-eminence in all cases, ex
cept in 
a specific case where the competing value has some extraordinary or overwh
elming 
weight.
61 As a consequence, the effect of privacy laws has been significantly reduced 
because of the pre-eminence given to freedom of speech in the First Amendment.
62 
59 William Prosser Restatement of the Law of Torts 1977 (United States, 1977) § § 652B-652E. 
60 Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2005) 51. 
61 E Paton-Simpson "Human Interests: Privacy and Free Speech in the Balance" I 6 
NZLR 225,226 . 
62 See, W P Keeton (cd) Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5ed, West Publishing
 Co, Sl Pauls, 1984) 
860-862. See also IIarry Kalvern Jr "Privacy in lo11 Law - Were Warren and B
randeis Wrong?" ( 1966) 
31 Law & Con temp Probs 327,336. 
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In fact, due to the First Amendment protection of free speech in the United States, 
private litigation brought as a result of publication of private facts is so limited by free 
speech concerns that it is almost always unsuccessful. 63 As one academic has noted, 
when expectations of freedom of speech collide with expectations of privacy, "p1ivacy 
almost always loses."64 This is illustrated in the case of Florida Star v BJF, where the 
Supreme Court held that the imposition of damages against a newspaper for publishing a 
rape victim's name was in violation of the First Amendment, despite the fact that it was a 
c1ime and a violation of the newspaper's internal policy to do so.65 The Court held that 
the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First 
Amendment and privacy rights counsels the com1 to rely on "limited principles that 
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case."66 In this case, 
the Com1 held that to impose liability for a breach of privacy interests would not be an 
approp1iate limitation upon the First Amendment.67 
B United Kingdom 
1 Non-public register 
In the United Kingdom, the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and Sexual Offences Act 
2003 established a non-public register, known as ViSOR (the Violent and Sex Offender 
Register). While ViSOR can only be accessed by police and probation service personnel , 
there is selective 'controlled disclosure' of info1mation to certain officials, professionals 
and members of the public. Offenders are required to register if they are convicted of an 
applicable crime,68 found not guilty by reason of insanity but still pose public danger, or 
if an offender is cautioned by a police officer and admits the offence at the time. 
Controversially, ViSOR also contains info1mation on persons who have not been 
convicted but are thought to be at risk of offending. 
63 Diane Zimmerman "Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort" 
(1983) 68 Cornell L Rev 291. 
64 Anderson, "The failure of American privacy law" in Markesinis (ed) Protecting Privacy (Oxford 
University Press , New York , 1999) 139, 140. 
65 Florida Star v BJF (1989) 491 US 524, I 09 SCt 2603. Furd1er examples of thi s liberal mindset are: Cox 
Broadcasting Co1p v Cohn 420 US 469 ; Metter \' Los Angeles Examiner ( 1939) 95 P 2d 491 (2nd Cir). 
66 Florida Star v BJF (1989) 49 l US 524, I 09 SCt, 2603. 
67 Ibid , 2604. 
68 The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) ex tends to a wide range of crimes, including incest and possessio n 
of indecent photographs or children. 
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In addition to the requirement that sex offenders supply their name, age 
and 
address, the register also holds an offender's photograph, risk a
ssessment, modus 
operandi and audit trail. 
69 An offender remains on the register for a period of time 
varying from five years (if the offender is cautioned or imprisoned
 for less than six 
months) to indefinite (if the offence catTies a penalty of imprisonment 
for life). Offenders 
are also required to notify the autho1ities each time they change ad
dress and are also 
required to notify police if they are to leave the country for more than e
ight days.
70 
2 Protection afforded to privacy rights 
Traditionally in England it was thought that there was no common law
 protection 
of privacy. This was made clear in the case of Kaye v Robertson 
71 and reiterated by the 
House of Lords in 1996 in R v Brown,
72 when Lord Hoffman definitively stated that: 
"English common law does not know a general 1ight to privacy."
73 However, in A -G v 
Guardian Newspapers (No 2) the boundaries of the equitable breach of co
nfidence action 
were extended to allow protection for p1ivacy interests in circum
stances where no 
confidential relationship existed .
74 The most recent English privacy cases all demonstrate 
a trend towards developing the action of breach of confidence t
o protect privacy 
interests.7
5 For example, in A v B, Lord Woolf pronounced, "if there is an intrusion in
 a 
situation where a person can reasonably expect his privacy to be re
spected , then that 
intrusion will be capable of giving rise to liability for breach of confid
ence."76 Similarly, 
Sedley LJ asse11ed in Doug las v Hello ! that " [the plaintiffs] have a right to
 p1ivacy, which 
English law will today recognise and protect." 
77 Thus , it can now be said with confidence 
that privacy interests are protected in the English common law (albei
t through the guise 
of the action of breach of confidence). 
69 Ibid , SS 83-84 . 
70 Sex Offenders (Notice Req uirement) (Foreign Trave l) Regulations 2001 (
UK). 
71 Kaye v Robertson [199 1] FS R 62. 
72 R v Brown [1 996] AC 543. 
73 Ibid ,557 Lo rd Hoffm an. 
74 A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
75 See generall y: Hel/ewe/1 v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1 995] I WL
R 804; Doug las v He/lo! Ltd 
[2005] EWCA C iv 595; A v B p ie [2002] 2 All ER 545; Campbell v MGM
 Ltd [2003] I All ER 224; and 
Green Corns Ltd v CLA Verley Group Ltd [2005] EWHC 958 (QB). 
16 A v B p ie [2002] 2 All ER 545, 554 , Lord Woo lf. 
77 Douglas v Hello' Ltd, above n 75, 100 1, Lord Jus ti ce Sedley. 
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AdditionaJly, the right to privacy has been given legislative recognition by the 
incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into English 
domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998.78 Article 8 of the ECHR contains a 
right to private and family life, home and correspondence. The ECHR has acted as a 
catalyst for judges to give more overt recognition of breach of privacy rights and further 
expanded the breach of confidence action. 
The expanding protection of privacy interests through actions m breach of 
confidence has lead some commentators to assert that breach of confidence and the tort of 
privacy may realistically be distinguished in name only: "[i]t is evident that the real 
concern of English comis is to protect the privacy of the individual."79 Indeed, Justice 
Laws in Hellewell commented that "the law [will] protect what might reasonably be 
caJled a right of privacy, although the name accorded to the action would be breach of 
confidence."80 There are, however, a number of academics who dispute the existence of 
only cosmetic differences between the claims. According to Bridget Murphy, the 
redefinition of breach of confidence sits uneasily with the traditional concepts of the 
doctrine, which is founded upon the integrity of confidential relationships as a matter of 
equity, in contrast to actions for invasion of privacy, which are founded upon individual 
autonomy. 81 Murphy argues that as a consequence, breach of confidence can therefore 
only accommodate one aspect of the developing to1i of privacy - the public disclosure of 
private facts. 82 
3 Freedom of expression 
English law historically took little notice of concepts such as freedom of speech, 
but English cou1ts increasingly relied on common law principles of freedom of speech to 
limit the scope of other common law rules (for example, in libel, breach of confidence 
78 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s l ( l ), sch I. 
79 Burrows (ed) Todd on Torts (8ed, 2001, Brokers, Wellington) 917. 
80 Helf ewe// v Chief Constable of Derbyshire, above n 75,807 Laws J. 
81 Bridget K Murphy "Developments in the Law of Invasion of Privacy in New Zealand and England: L v 
G, A I' B" (2002) 9 AULR I 03 l , l 040. 
82 Ibid. 
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and contempt of court).
83 Judges were also influenced in the 1980s and 
1990s by Article 
l O the ECHR, which guarantees the right to "r
eceive and impart info1mation", although 
its provisions were not binding on them at that
 time.
84 Hence, both in common law cases 
and in the context of statutory interpretation, c
omts became increasingly willing to apply 
a freedom of speech principle. Accordingly, t
he English right to freedom of expression 
was developed and established in common l
aw before being statutorily recognised in 
1998 with the incorporation of the ECHR thro
ugh the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). 
As a result, freedom of speech is now an accep
ted pa1t of English law. Indeed, it has been 
said that "there is a constitutional 1ight to freed
om of expression".
85 
It should be noted that there is no 1ight to acces
s information under Article 10 of 
the ECHR; the freedom of expression prote
cted being a negative liberty, protecting 
against State interference. This was confim1ed 
in the case of Leander v Sweden, in which 
the European Court on Human Rights held that
 Alticle l 0, in providing a right to "receive 
infomrntion" signifies a right that is limited to 
receiving info1mation "that others wish or 
may be willing to impait."
86 The Court held that Article 10 did not con
fer on the 
individual a right of access to a state register
, nor did it embody an obligation on the 
government to impart such infoimation.
87 
4 Conflicts and resolution 
In dete1mining the relationship between the rig
ht to privacy expressed in Article 8 
of the ECHR, and the protection of freedom o
f expression guaranteed in Article 10, the 
English comts have determined that neither h
as a presumptive right. Instead, the rights 
are to be balanced against each other, as illus
trated in the case of Campbell v MGN, in 
which Lord Hoffman stated: "there is a need t
o ensure that the essence of the pruticular 
situation is exrunined, with due weight given 
to conflicting interests under the HRA."
88 
This is despite section 12 of the HRA, which 
stipulates that the courts must have regard 
83 Eric Barendt, above n 60, 40. 
84 See, for example, A-G v BBC [ 1981] AC 303 (
HL) . 
85 Reynolds v Tim es Newspapers [200 l] 2 AC 127,2
07 Lord Steyn . 
86 Leander v Sweden Series A, no l I 6, 29, para 74 (
 l 978). 
87 Tbid . 
88 Ca111pbell 1• MGN Ltd, above n 75, para 55, Lo rd H
offman; paras I 04- 106 Lord I Iope. 
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to the importance of the convention right to freedom of expression. While section 12 
could have been used to elevate the right to freedom of expression over privacy, com1s 
have rejected such an interpretation, as illustrated in the case of In re S (a child) 
(Identification: restrictions on publication), in which the House of Lords said: 89 
First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the 
values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative 
importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary . 
Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be 
taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. 
C Australia 
1 Non-public register 
All State governments m Australia are responsible for monito1ing individual 
offenders within their jurisdiction and the maintenance of their own registers. 90 State 
registers contain an offender's name, address, employment, car registration, fingerprints, 
offences and travel arrangements (including inter-state). Offences requiring registration 
include offences of a public nature (such as rape, indecent conduct and grooming of 
minors) but extend to offences such as possession of child pornography. Info1mation 
about the offender is kept on state registers for periods ranging from eight years to life, 
depending on the number and type of offences. Offences are classified as either class one 
(murder, sexual intercourse or persistent sexual abuse of a child), or class two (acts of 
indecency punishable by 12 months imprisonment or more). 
At national level, the National Sex Offender System encompasses the sharing of 
offender information across state borders using the Australian National Child Offender 
Register (ANCOR). The national system is centred on the CrimTrac agency, which 
controls the national fingerptint and DNA databases, and also includes information on 
89 See, for examp le, In re S (a child) (Identification: restrictions on publication) [2005] I AC 593 (HL). 
90 Most State reg isters are based primarily on the New South Wales register, which was established through 
the Child Protection (Offender Registration) Act 2000 (NSW). Other State registers were estab lished 
through the following Acts: Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic); Child Protection (Offender 
Reporting and Registration) Act 2004 (NT); Chi ld Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (QLD); and 
Community Protection (0 ffencler Repo11ing) Ac t 2004 (WA). 
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children who live with the offender, membership of clubs and tim
e spent in correctional 
facilities. Australian registers are non-public, as public com
munity registers were 
considered to "fail to achieve their goals and lead to 
significant unintended 
consequences. "
91 
2 Protection afforded to privacy interests 
With no Bill of Rights and no mention of a right to privacy in
 the Australian 
Constitution,9
2 it was left to common law to develop a right to privacy in Australi
a. There 
were some early indications that a p1ivacy to11 might be introduc
ed, when in Church of 
Scientology Inc v Woodward, Murphy J identified the "unjustified 
invasion of p1ivacy" as 
a developing to11.
93 However, later com1s have declined to recognise a stand-alone 1
ight 
to privacy in Australia.
94 The development of a tort of p1ivacy at common law has long 
been regarded as restricted by the decision in Victoria Park R
acing and Recreation 
Grounds v Taylor. 
95 In that case, Latham CJ rejected the submission that the law of 
nuisance included protection of a right to p1ivacy. However, rece
ntly the case of ABC v 
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd9
6 has cast doubt on that position. In Lenah it was suggested 
that the High Com1 of Australia would give effect to a right of
 privacy similar to that 
protected by the New Zealand tort prior to Hosking, through an ex
tension of the breach of 
confidence action. 
Essentially, therefore, the High Coui1 of Australia has not ruled ou
t the possibility 
of a common law to11 of privacy, nor has it embraced it with ope
n arms. As a result, the 
High Com1 of Australia has left it open as to whether the to11 e
xists, and lower com1s 
have subsequently arrived at inconsistent decisions. 
97 Along with the conflicting 
developments of the right to privacy in common law, there 
have been conflicting 
91 Caslon Analytics offender registries http ://www.caslon.com.au (a
ccessed 17 July 2008). 
92 Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900 (Cth). 
93 Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25. 
94 See, Cruise and Kidman v Southdown Press Pty Ltd (1993) 26 [
PR 125; and Australian Consolidated 
Press Ltd vEttingshausen (Cow1of Appeal , New South Wales, CA
40079 of 1993 , 13 October 1993). 
95 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds v Taylor ( l 93 7) 58 CLR 4 79. 
96 A BC v lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (200 I) l 85 ALR I. 
97 To date, two lower co u11s have held that such a cause of action 
is part or the common law of Australia: 
Grosse v Pu1vis (2003) Aust To11s Reports 8 1-706; Doe I' Australi
an Broadcasting Co1poration [2007] 
vcc 281. 
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legislative developments concerning privacy in Australia. Despite the fact that privacy 
rights are increasingly being afforded protection through statutory law in Australia, no 
common, statutory protection against the invasion of privacy has yet been established . 
While historically the Australian Law Reform Commission declined to 
recommend the creation of a general tort of privacy, 98 it has since proposed that, to 
ensure consistent p1ivacy protection, a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy 
should be recognised by the legislature in Australia. 99 At federal level, the enactment of 
the P1ivacy Act 1988 (Cth) '00 conferred a degree of enforcement power upon the Federal 
Court and the Federal Magistrates Court to protect p1ivacy (although a much watered 
down protection than the proposed introduction of an action for breach of privacy). The 
Australian Government also ratified the ICCPR in 1980, which contains a right to privacy 
in AI1icle 17. Additionally, at state level, a right to privacy has been expressly mentioned 
in the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT). 
3 Freedom of expression 
In addition to the absence of a 1ight to privacy in the Australian Constitution, 
there is no explicit guarantee of freedom of speech. While Australia is a signatory to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms the right of free speech in AI1icle 
19,101 no government has implemented the free speech provisions, and as a result, they 
are not enforceable in Australian Com1s. There have been several attempts to introduce a 
right to freedom of speech and expression into the Australian Constitution, or through a 
Bill of Rights, but so far all such attempts have failed. 102 One example is the case of 
Miller v TCN Channel Nine, in which Murphy J attempted to read in a right to freedom of 
expression into the Australian Constitution by refeJTing to "guarantees of freedom of 
speech" found in section 92 of the Constitution (which refers to free trade within the 
98 Australi an Law Reform Commission, Privacy, ALRC 22 (1983), para 1081 . 
99 Australi an Law Reform Commiss ion, Review of Australian Privacy Law, DP 72 (2007), Proposals 5 1-7 . 100 Amend ed by the Privacy Amendment (Private Sec tor) Act 2000 (Cth) . 
10 1 
Universal Declaration ofI-Iuman Rights, UNGA Resolution 217A (Ill) (10 December 1948), art 19. 102 See generall y: 1942 Constitutional Convention held in Canbena; Constitution Alteration (Post-War 
Reconstructi on and Democratic Rights) Bill 1944 (Cth); Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) ; Australian 
Human Ri ghL~ Bill 198 5 (Cth). 
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Commonwealth). 
103 However, this judgment brought stinging rebuke from other judges, 
including Justice Sir Anthony Mason, who reto11ed "I cannot find any basis for implying 
a new section 92A into the Constitution."
104 
Freedom of expression, therefore, like almost all civil liberties in Australia, is 
afforded protection through common law. As Australian common law shares its essential 
features with English common law, Australian cow1s are influenced by English precedent 
and give legal recognition to the right of freedom of expression. As a result, freedom of 
expression is a recognised and established 1ight under Australian common law, and 
regarded as a 'civil right' and fundamental freedom.
105 
4 Conflicts and resolution 
Because an established right to protection against a breach of p1ivacy is not 
evident in Australian law, either through legislation or common law, it is unlikely that sex 
offender registers would be challenged on the ground of breach of privacy. Fu11herrnore, 
with respect to existing registers, neither at state nor federal level is sex offender 
infonnation disclosed to the public, so an unjustified breach of one's right to p1ivacy 
(should it exist) would not occur. 
D Canada 
1 Non-public register 
The Canadian federal structure has resulted in a mix of federal and provincial 
registers. Ontario's Sex Offender Registration Act 2001 formed the basis for most 
provincial legislation until recently, when the National Sex Offender Registry came into 
force in 2004. 
106 While some provinces have adopted 'limited disclosure' registers, the 
national register is private.
107 The national register is applicable to anyone convicted, or 
found not guilty by reason of insanity, of an offence under section 490.011 of the 
103 Miller v TCN Chann el Nine ( 1988) 161 CLR 556. 
104 Ibid, 568 Murphy J. 
105 
Carol Foley Th e Australian Flag: Colonial Relic or Contemporc11y Item ? (Federation Press, 
Vic toria , 
1996) 156. 
106 The National Sex Offender Registry came into force with the passage or the Sex Offender 
Information 
Registration Act RSC 1985 c A-1. 
107 Ibid, s 16 . 
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Criminal Code (which includes wide rangmg offences such as incest, bestiality, 
possession of child pornography and indecent exposure). Offenders are registered for the 
maximum penalty they could have received for their offence if sentenced (that is: 10 
years; 20 years; or life). A second conviction results in registration for life. 
Under the national scheme, convicted offenders may be ordered by a com1 to 
register their name, age, address, phone number and physical description with the 
registration centre in their area. 108 The registration centre will then put that information , 
along with their offences, victims and court orders on the register. 109 Offenders must 
update this info1mation when necessary and are required to notify the authorities if they 
are to be absent from their address for 15 consecutive days. 
2 Protection afforded to privacy interests 
Like the NZBORA, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not 
specifically guarantee a right to privacy. However, in interpreting section 8 of the Chru1er 
(the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure), Canadian courts have 
recognised an individual's right to a reasonable expectation of p1ivacy. In City of 
Longueuil v Godbout, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the protection accorded 
to privacy under section 8 is to guru·antee a sphere of individual autonomy for all 
decisions relating to "choices that are of a fundamentally p1ivate or inherently personal 
nature". 11° Fw1hermore, in R v Duarte, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the police 
could not ru·bitrarily record and transmit private communications in the course of 
surveillance, confinning that section 8 protected the right of individuals to control the 
l f 1 . C: • 111 re ease o persona m1ormat10n. 
Ce11ain provincial Cha11ers have gone further than the implied protection of 
privacy afforded in the Canadian Chruter by expressly protecting privacy interests. An 
example is section 5 of the Quebec Chruter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which 
108 Ibid, s 4( l ) . 
109 Ibid, s 8. 
11° City of l onguellil v Godbout [1 997 J J SCR 844 ,9 13. 
111 R vD!larte [1 990l I SC R JO. 
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guarantees every person "a right to respect for his private life". The S
upreme Cou1t of 
Canada has subsequently awarded damages for a breach of the 
1ight to p1ivacy 
guaranteed by section 5 of the Quebec Charter. In Les Editions Vice-Ver
sa v Aubry and 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
112 the Supreme Court upheld section 5 of the 
Quebec Charter when the respondent 's photograph, taken in a public
 place, was 
published in an arts magazine. The Court considered that the purpose of
 section 5 was to 
protect a sphere of individual autonomy, 
113 and held that the right to respect for private 
life was infringed as soon as one's image is published without conse
nt, provided the 
individual concerned is identifiable in the image. 
114 
While recent authorities evidence a growing recognition of the right to p
rotection 
of privacy interests, Canadian comts have not yet reached a clear conse
nsus. In Hung v 
Gardiner, 1
15 the Supreme Court of British Columbia declined to follow Aubry, refusi
ng 
to accept that there was a common law to1t of invasion of privacy in
 the province of 
British Columbia in addition to the protection afforded by the British C
olumbia Privacy 
Act. The Cou1t held that as Aub1y was an action for breach of privacy un
der section 5 of 
the Quebec Charter, it was only applicable as autho1ity within the Quebe
c province.
11 6 
There are other indications, however, that pnvacy concerns are inc
reasingly 
receiving legal protection in Canada. Ce1tain Canadian provinces have
 enacted privacy 
legislation, with B1itish Colombia, Manitobia and several other pro
vinces enacting 
Privacy Acts. 
11 7 The wording of the statutes is very general, with the legislation 
providing civil sanctions for violating the privacy of another. In the District
 Comt in 
MacKay v Buelow, it was held that a to1t of invasion of privacy does ex
ist in Canadian 
common law.
118 In that case it was implicitly accepted that danrnges could be awarded for 
11 2 Les Editions Vice-Versa v Aub1y and Canadian Broadcasting Co1poration
 [l 9981 l SCR 591. 
113 Ibid, 594. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Hung v Gardiner [2002) BCSC 1234. 
11 6 Ibid, para 110 Joyce J. 
11 7 Privacy Act 1996 RSBC c 737 (British Colombia); Privacy Act CCS
M s P 125 (Manitobia); see also 
Privacy Act 1978 RSS c P-24 (Saskatchewan); Privacy Act 1990 RS
NL c P-22 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador) . 
118 MacKay v Bue/o\V ( 1995) 11 RFL (4th) 403 Binks J. 
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a breach of privacy, and general damages of $25,000 were awarded with little discussion 
of the nature of the tot1. From these authorities, one can deduce that the right to 
protection against a breach of privacy is certainly gaining greater recognition in Canadian 
law, although the position is still far from settled. 
3 Freedom of expression 
Until the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian 
free speech law had largely followed the common law approach in England. In 1982 the 
Charter transformed the legal position, guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression. 
Specifically, section 2 provides to "everyone" the "fundamental freedom" of "thought, 
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication." 119 
From its first decision on freedom of expression, 120 the Canadian Supreme Court 
has taken a broad view of the scope of the 1ight to freedom of expression; it encompasses 
all modes of expression that attempt to convey meaning. 121 The underlying rationale for 
the protection of expression is the realisation of self-fulfilment. 122 Yet, this right is not 
absolute, for section I states: "The Canadian Charter ... guarantees the tights set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits presctibed by law as can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society." 123 Therefore, the right to freedom of expression may be 
limited by a right to protection from a breach of privacy (if recognised), if the limitation 
is deemed justifiable in a free and democratic society. If a limitation on a Charter tight is 
deemed unjustified, Canadian courts have a right to strike down the legislation (unlike 
New Zealand). 
11 9 Constitution Act 1982, Par1 I, s 2. 
120 RWDSU "Dolphin De/ive1y Ltd ( l 986] 2 SCR 573. 
121 R vSha1pe (2001] I SCR45, 968 . 
122 See genera ll y R 1• Keegstra (199013 SCR 697. 
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4 Conflicts and resolution 
The Canadian Chatter does not give prommence to one right over another. 
Instead, Canadian comts are prepared to balance competing rights in light of the 
paiticular circumstances, and comts ai·e not restricted by the use of formulated 
principles. 124 When rights are purpo1ted to be limited, cou1ts engage in a prop01tionality 
test to detennine whether such a restriction on a right can be "demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society''.
125 In exainining this question, comts apply a test derived 
from the Canadian Supreme Comt decision of R v Oakes, 
126 which can be broken down 
into four constituent elements: whether the restiiction fulfils a pressing and substantive 
objective; whether the means adopted have a rational connection to this objective; 
whether there exists propo1tionality between the limitation and the objective; and whether 
there is minimal impairment upon the right. Therefore, when detennining whether a 
restriction on a 1ight may be justified, the Canadian Supreme Comt fully considers the 
context of the particular case and the value of the expression at issue. 
E Conclusion 
From this overview, one can observe that sex offender registers (both public and 
non-public) can survive in the face of the competing 1ights to freedom of expression and 
p1ivacy. The question still to be answered, however, is whether such a register could 
survive in New Zealand's legal climate. In determining this, one can have regard to the 
c1iteria identified in the Oakes test (which has subsequently been applied and adopted 
into the New Zealand legal system), 
127 which looks to factors such as proportionality and 
pressing and substa11tive objectives in evaluating whether something is justifiable in a 
free and democratic society. The following exainination of the policy rationales behind 
sex offender registers will therefore question whether such registers do in fact have 
pressing and substantive objectives, and whether they can adequately fulfil those 
objectives without disproportionately encroaching upon an offender's 1ight to privacy. 
124 Eric Barendt, above n 60 , 57. 
125 Canad ian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, above n 11 9, s 1. 
126 R vOakes [ 1986) 1 SCR 103 . 
127 See, fo r example, lfansen v R [2007) NZSC 7 and Moon en v Film & Literature Board of Review
 [2002) 
2NZLR 9. 
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V ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 
While legislation for the registration of sex offenders is no doubt well-intentioned, 
there has been much criticism of the effectiveness of sex offender registers. Before 
implementing such legislation in New Zealand, one must question whether sex offender 
registers are an effective mechanism in the prevention, deterrence and investigation of 
sexual offending. This section will determine whether, and to what extent, laws 
mandating the registration and publication of sexual offender information do in fact 
address the underlying policy rationales driving them, or whether the consequential 
negative effects of a register would in fact outweigh the ostensible goals such laws set out 
to achieve. This section will conclude that, while the implementation of a public register 
would not be justifiable due to its potential negative consequences, the implementation of 
a non-public register would adequately address the policy rationales underlying a sex 
offender register. 
A Arguments for sex offender registers 
1 The public's right to freedom of expression 
The 1ight to freedom of expression, manifested in section 14 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA), gives citizens the freedom to "seek, receive and impart 
infonnation." 128 However, this freedom is not absolute, as section 5 of the NZBORA 
stipulates that freedom of expression may be subject to limitations that are demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 129 Proponents of a public register rely on the 
recent Supreme Court decision of Brooker v Police, in which the majority considered that 
as freedom of expression is expressly affomed in the NZBORA it 1s a right of 
fundamental impo11ance, in contrast to privacy, which they considered to be a mere 
value. 130 Rights were considered to have a dominant status, the 'non-1ight' having to be 
justified as a reasonable limit on the right. 131 Those endorsing public registers argue that 
the right to receive information has a dominant status in relation to p1ivacy interests, and 
restricting their right to receive information to the extent that they may not receive 
128 New Zea land Bill of Ri ghts Act 1990, s 14. 
129 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act l 990. s 5. 
130 Brooker v Police, above n 45 , para 40 , E lias CJ. 
13 1 Ibid. 
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info1mation on a sexual offender living in their community (due to the offender's right to 
privacy) is an unreasonable limitation on their right to freedom of expression. 
2 Investigation and prevention of future offending 
One of the primary rationales in establishing a sex offender register is to assist the 
police in the prevention and investigation of sexual offences.
132 While it is admitted that 
there are methodological baITiers to demonstrating a coITelation between sex offender 
legislation and reduced recidivism rates, it is believed that by having an easily accessible 
register, police will be able to monitor sex offenders in the community, preventing and 
reducing future offending. In suppo11 of this, a 2005 Washington study suggested 
community notification laws to be paitly responsible for the reduction of new sexual 
offences from 7 per cent to 2 per cent.
133 
3 Deterrence 
DeteITence 1s another impo11ant objective behind the concept of a public 
register. 134 It has been suggested that publicity is "one of the chief deteITents to evil-
doing; and one of the severest punishments that evil-doers have to face."
135 However, 
studies have questioned the effectiveness of publicity as a deteITent. In one survey 
conducted by the United States Depaitment of Justice concerning the effectiveness of 
public registers on re-offending, the following response from offenders was typical: 
136 
[f you're going to re-offend, it doesn't matter if you're on TV, in the newspaper, 
whatever, you're going to re-offend. And there's nothing to stop you. It's a choice you 
make ... The on! y person that can stop it is the sex offender himself. 
While deteITence is thought to be an important factor in relation to sexual 
offending, as there is a common perception that sexual offenders have high rates of 
112 Sex Offenders Registry Bill 2003, above n 3, Explanatory note. 
113 Kate Fitch "Megan 's Law: Does it protect children (2)?" (2000) NSPCC 36. 
134 
C laire Baylis, "Justice Done and Justice Seen to be Done - The Public Admini tration of Justice" (2001) 
2 1 VUWLR 177 , 178 . 
135 R Munday, "Name Suppression: an adjunct to the presumption of innocence and to the mitigation of 
sentence - l " [1991] CrimLR 680,755. 
iv, US Department of Justice "Managing Sex Offenders in the Community: A National Overview" 
(Oregon, September 30, 2001) 2 1. 
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recidivism, 137 studies in the United States repo11 paedophile recidivism rates of 10.9 per 
cent 138 and 12.7 per cent. 139 These rates are much lower than the recidivism rates of drug 
offenders and violent offenders. 140 A number of recent reports also show that specialised 
prison and community based treatment programmes in New Zealand are reducing the 
rates of paedophile recidivism to as low as 5.2 per cent. 141 However, while recidivism 
rates may not be as high as common perception, if registers do have the proposed 
deterrent effect, this is certainly a substantial factor in favour ofregistration. 
4 Open justice 
In the context of com1 proceedings, there is a prima facie presumption in favour 
of openness when a judge is considering whether to grant a suppression order. The Court 
of Appeal has made it clear that sexual offenders cannot nonnally expect their names to 
be suppressed. 142 In pai1icular, the Court of Appeal in R v Liddell 143 highlighted the 
importance of the principles of freedom of speech and open justice. Cooke P 
acknowledged the importance of the competing right to privacy, but noted that it would 
rarely be enough to displace the weighty presumption in favour of openness. 144 
Subsequent authorities have mandated that "compelling reasons" or "very special 
circumstances" must be present to justify departure from the principle of open justice. 145 
The principle of open justice is today associated with the wider 1ight to freedom 
of expression, which affords the public a right to receive info,mation. 146 In accordance 
137 Mike Smith "Sex Offender Registry OK'd" (20 February 1996) The Journal Gazette, Fo1i Wayne. 138 M Alexander "Sex Offender Treatment: A response to Furey, et al 1989" (Presentation at Conference of 
the American Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Beaverton, 11 November 1994). 139 Lita Furby, Mark Weinrott and Lyn Blackshaw " Sex Offender Recidivism: A review" (1989) 105 
Psychology Bulletin 3. 
140 2004/2005 Depa1iment of Corrections Annua I Repo1t http://www.corrections.govt.nz (accessed 16 July 
2008). 
141 Depa1iment of Corrections "Community Solutions for the Community's Problem: An Outcome 
Evaluation ofThree New Zealand Community Paedophile treatment Programmes" (Auckland, 2003), 24. 
The sexual offenders who completed the Kia Marama programme at Rolleston prison in Christchurch 
had a recidivism rate of8 per cent, while the offenders from the Te Pi1iti programme at Auckland prison 
had a recidivism rate of 5.47 per cent. 142 Prock/er v R [ 1997] I NZLR 295,300 (CA) Thomas J for the Court. 
143 RvLidde!l[1995] I NZLR538 . 
144 Ibid, 547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
145 See Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 18 ([IC) Hammond J. 146 Police v O'Connor [ 1992] I NZLR 87, 97 (HC) Thomas J. 
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with the underlying notions of both principles , one could asse1t that there shou
ld be a 
presumption in favour of releasing a convicted offender's info1mation to the comm
unity. 
Support for this proposition can be drawn from the decision of Police v O'Conno
r, in 
which Thomas J stated that the public's right to receive information under the umbr
ella of 
freedom of expression extends to comt proceedings. 
147 Thus, proponents of a register 
would state that, in accordance with the principle of open justice, the public has a 
1ight to 
information about the conviction of sexual offenders. 
5 Public protection 
A powerful rationale underlying the implementation of a register is the potential
 
protection it will afford the public. The theo1y that a social contract exists betw
een the 
State and its citizens assetts that citizens are obliged to pay taxes to the State wh
ich, in 
return, must provide its citizens with protection. 
148 Under this theory, it can be argued 
that the State has a duty to provide the public with protection through the rel
ease of 
details of sexual offenders to the community. The release of info1mation abo
ut sex 
offenders is thought to increase public safety as the public will be able to recogn
ise sex 
offenders in their community and to take the necessary steps to keep themselves an
d their 
children safe from such offenders, who could otherwise go unnoticed.
149 
6 Conclusion 
While these justifications provide a sound basis for the implementation of a sex
 
offender register in New Zealand, it is necessary to examine whether a register w
ould in 
fact address these underlying concerns, thereby fulfilling pressing and sub
stantial 
objectives. Furthe1more, it is necessary to identify whether there would be any a
dverse 
negative effects associated with registration which would consequently resu
lt in a 
disproportionate breach of offenders ' rights in promoting public protection and th
e right 
to freedom of expression. For these reasons , it is necessary to explore the arg
uments 
advanced against sex offender registers. 
147 Ibid, 97 (HC) Thomas J. 
148 See general! y, Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract (Penguin C lass ics, Hanno
ndsworth , I 968). 
149 Caston Ana lyti cs o ffender reg is tri es, above n 9 1. 
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B Arguments against sex offender registers 
1 An offender's right to privacy 
Although there is no general right to privacy in New Zealand legislation, an 
independent legal right to privacy is afforded to individuals under the common law action 
of the tort of breach of p1ivacy. Those arguing against the implementation of a sex 
offender register would claim that although a right to privacy is not expressly included in 
the NZBORA, privacy is nevertheless an existing right of equal standing. This is in 
accordance with the case of Hosking, in which Tipping J in the majority did not consider 
that "omission from the Bill of Rights Act can be taken as a legislative rejection of 
privacy as [a] ... fundamental value." 150 A recent Law Commission study also lends 
support to this position, as it suggests that a proper weighting of freedom of expression 
and privacy should be given in the particular circumstances in which they arise, rather 
than a general mle classifying the relative importance of each value.
151 Those against the 
implementation of a public sex offender register would then argue that when the public's 
right to freedom of expression is upheld by disseminating information from a sex 
offender register, this creates an unjustifiable breach upon an offender's 1ight to p1ivacy. 
2 Emotionally charged legislation 
Sensationalized sex offence cases have understandably shocked and angered our society. 
Many legislative actions regarding sex offenders resulted from emotional public response 
to violent crime rather than from research showing that these laws would make any 
positive difference in correcting the problem and reducing crime. 152 
There are concerns that, although the idea behind public registers is wo11hy in p1inciple, 
the practical effectiveness of such airnngements has not been given enough rational 
thought. The United States Depa11ment of Justice commented in 2003 that, unlike issues 
such as insurance regulation or seat-belt laws, "sexual abuse is inte1twined with a strong 
emotionalism that exacts an almost visceral response in nearly everyone." 153 As a result, 
150 Hosking v Runting, above n 25, para 92 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
151 "Privacy concepts and issues: review of the law of privacy stage 1 ", above n 30, 68. 
152 "Managi ng Sex Offenders in the Community: A National Overview", above n 136, 14. 
153 Ibid. 
37 
the Department of Justice alleges that lawmakers' abilities 
to create an effective 
legislative regime are clouded by this emotional response to se
xual abuse, resulting in 
laws that are ce11ainly well-intentioned but are nonetheless ineffec
tive. 
3 Dangers of vigilantism 
There have been incidents where the release of infonnation abo
ut sex offenders 
has led to vigilantes using the info1mation to harass, threaten 
and even murder listed 
offenders. In one such incident, a vigilante, using publicly available
 information on the 
internet, tracked down 24 year old William Elliott to his residenti
al address and shot him 
dead. Elliot had been convicted of statutory rape over conse
nsual activity with his 
younger girlfriend, who was days away from turning 16.
154 Another example is the 2000 
'Sarah's Law' campaign in England, in which details of 100
,000 paedophiles were 
published in the News of the World tabloid. The campaign resulted 
in demonstrations and 
attacks on sex offenders in which homes and property were d
estroyed, five families 
unconnected with sex offenders were forced to flee , and even a f
emale paediatrician was 
forced from town when vigilantes confused her title with that of a 
paedophile.
155 
Although all foreign legislation establishing sex offender re
gisters contains 
provisions against the improper use of sex offender infonnation
, this does not stop the 
abuse of information contained in sex offender registers. For 
exan1ple, while United 
States' legislation imposes a $500-$ l OOO fine for the imp
roper use of register 
information, 
156 a survey caITied out in 2005 found that one-third of convicted m
ale sex 
offenders listed on a public register claimed to have experience
d "dire events" such as 
harassment and vandalism by vigilantes.
157 It is submitted that New Zealand could limit 
the dangers of vigilantism by the implementation of a non-public
 register, of which only 
the police force and other individuals authorised by the Ministe
r of Justice would have 
access for law enforcement and other authorised purposes. 
154 Murder Put Focus on Sex-Offender Reg istry Policies http://www
.npr.org (accessed 2 1 May 2008). 
155 Doctor Driven out of Home by Vigilantes http ://www.guardian.co
.uk (accessed 31 Ma y 2008). 
156 Jacob Wetterling Act, above n 52 . 
157 Kate Fitch, above n 133, 40. 
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4 Adverse effect on rehabilitation 
One of the major objectives of society, and of the administration ofour penal system, is 
the rehabilitation of the fallen and the reformation of the criminal. It is our object to lift 
up and sustain the unfortunate rather than tear him down. Where a person has by his 
own efforts rehabilitated himself, we ... should permit him to continue in the path of 
rectitude rather than throw him back into a life of shame or crime. Even the thief on the 
cross was permitted to repent during the hours ofhis final agony. 158 
Overseas experience teaches us that the public release of sex offender information may 
have a disintegrative effect on sex offenders' rehabilitation. 159 A Washington survey 
revealed that offenders subject to community notification frequently leave communities 
after notification because they feel compelled to go 'underground' to avoid the ostracism, 
victimisation and vigilantism that results from disclosure. 160 Similarly, as a result of the 
publication of sex offender details in the News of the World campaign, it was repo11ed 
that "sex offenders have been breaking off contact with probation officers, moving from 
addresses that were monitored by police . .. failing to attend treatment programmes and 
adopting habits that signalled a return to offending." 161 This inevitably hinders the 
surveillance and treatment of offenders and makes it extremely difficult for offenders to 
develop new social-supportive contacts. 162 As a result, mental health professionals claim 
that public registration may increase, rather than decrease, sex offenders' likelihood of 
re-offending. 
5 Double punishment 
Double punishment is prohibited in New Zealand by vi11ue of section 26(2) of the 
NZBORA, which states "no one who has been finally . .. convicted of .. . an offence shall 
be ... punished for it again." 163 Publicity is seen as an extra punishment, and has indeed 
158 Melvin v Reid (1931) 11 2 P 285, 297 (4th Cir) . 
159 Eric Lotke " Politi cs and Irrelevance: Community Notification Statutes" ( 1997) 10 Fed Sent R 64, 66. 
160 Lyn Hinds and Kathleen Daly, "The War o n Sex Offenders: communit y notification in perspective" 
Australi an and New Zealand Journal of Criminology (2000) 20. 
161 Pressure to halt 'name and shame' campa ign http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/news (accessed 16 June 2008). 
162 "Managi ng Sex Offenders in the Community: A Natio nal Overview", above n 136, 2 1. 
163 New Zea land Bi ll of Ri ghts Act 1990, s 26(2) . 
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been recognised by New Zealand cou11s as serving a punitive funct
ion. 164 Those opposing 
a register claim that once offenders have served their sentence, th
ey have paid their debt 
to society, and any fi.u1her ' naming and shaming' is a double p
unishment.
165 It is also 
asse11ed that requiring sex offenders to update their address every
 time they move is an 
additional punishment to imprisonment, and monitoring schemes 
provided for under sex 
offender legislation are a tacit fonn of pe1manent irnpiisonment.
166 
On the other hand, it is arguable that name publication is an e
xpected cost in 
committing a criminal offence, and is not an additional punishme
nt. This was the view 
expressed by Tipping J in the case of Sanders v Police: "[p Jeople m
ust realise that 
publication of their names is part of the penalty for the commissio
n of crimes." 
167 While 
infonnation disseminated from a sex offender register would inv
olve more than just an 
offender's name, a non-public register would not make this
 information publicly 
available, only selectively disclosing information when deemed n
ecessary. Furthermore, 
in accordance with Kansas v Hendricks, it can be argued that the
 aim of sex offender 
registers is not to punish, but to enhance public safety. Thus , be
cause of the register's 
civil aims, disclosure under such a regime cannot be considered a 
'c1iminal sanction' and 
does not therefore constitute double punishment.
168 
6 Limited utility of registers 
(a) Misguided focus 
Community notification laws focus on a relatively rare fonn of sex
ual assault: that 
of random abuse or attack by a stranger. While these crimes 
are gaining increasing 
prominence in today's society, evidence suggests that most child
 sexual abusers offend 
against children whom they know and with whom they 
have an established 
164 See, Police v O'Connor [ 1992] 1 NZ LR 87, and a lso recently T v Po
lice (22 April 2005) HC DUN 
4 I 2/l 2 Chrisholm J. 
165 Caslo n Ana lyt ics Offender Registries, above n 9 1. 
166 Ibid . 
167 Sanders v Police U nreported, 20 Sep tember 199 1, High Court, Chris
tchurch Reg istry, Tipp ing J. 
168 Kansas v Hendricks 52 1 US 346,357, 11 7 SCt 2072 (1997). 
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relationship. 169 Ninety per cent of child victims know their offender, with almost half of 
offenders being a family member. 170 As a result, public registers as they stand are of 
limited use and public warnings are seemingly ineffective to prevent the majo1ity of 
sexual abuse cases. 
Another criticism of the effectiveness of registers concerns the misguided 
presupposition that an offender will re-offend in the area in which they live. 171 As noted 
previously, a potential consequence of community notification is the possibility that 
offenders will go 'underground' and move to other communities where they are not 
monitored or recognised. Public notification can only hope to increase safety within a 
limited area. 172 
(b) Reduction ofrepo11ing 
There is growing evidence that community notification laws may be affecting the 
repo11ing of intra-familial sexual abuse. Recent reports from New Jersey (where 
notification laws were first enacted) suggest a decrease in the repo11ing of both incest 
offences and juvenile sexual offences by victims and by family members. 173 Victims may 
be dete1Ted from reporting a family member as they may not want to put that family 
member at risk of retribution, or expose the rest of their family to ostracism and potential 
vigilantism. 174 As a result, commentators have concluded that " to date, there is little, if 
any, published evidence that [the United States sex offender registration legislation] 1s 
having any impact on reducing child sexual abuse." 175 
(c) Resources required 
While the notion of a sex offender register may be compelling, unless the register 
is sufficiently funded , it may not be able to address the goal sex offender registers aim to 
169 Pressure to halt ' name and shame' campaign, above n 16 1. 
170 Megan 's Law Info rmation http://www.ci.garden-grovc.ca. us/ (accessed 17 May 2008). 
171 Kate Fitch, above n 133, 42. 
172 Ibid. 
173 
"Managing Sex Offenders in the Community: A N ational Overview", above n 136, 16. 
174 Kate Fitch, above n 133 , 36. 
175 "Managing Sex Offenders in the Community: A Nationa l Overview", above n 136, 17. 
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achieve. As well as sizeable start-up costs, 
176 public registration requires continuous 
monitoring by the State to ensure offender compliance with registration: "millions of 
dollars are required to operate the systems in a manner likely to achieve any success."
177 
Unless a register receives the monetary support that it needs in order for it to remain up-
to-date and work efficiently, its objectives will not be achieved. This will mandate a 
significant financial commitment from the government of the day.
178 
C Conclusion 
In balancing the respective policy concerns explored above, one can detennine 
whether the implementation of a sex offender resister would in fact remedy the concerns 
it set out to address , thereby achieving pressing and substantial objectives , or whether the 
adverse consequences would outweigh any benefits proposed by implementation. Having 
considered the competing policy concerns, it is submitted that while the implementation 
of a public register would not be justifiable due the disproportionate breach of an 
offender's right to privacy and the potential adverse consequences associated with the 
public release of information, a non-public register would effectively address the 
underlying policy rationales behind sex offender registers. 
By not releasing offender infonnation to the general public, a non-public register 
would overcome obstacles of breaches of ptivacy, vigilantism and double punishment 
associated with the public disclosure of info1mation. Additionally, a non-public register 
would not hinder offenders' surveillance and treatment, as they would not be forced 
'underground' to escape public ' naming and shaming' , and instead they could be 
monitored and rehabilitated back into society. A well thought out and empirically-based 
Act implementing a non-public register would not suffer the consequences of poor, 
emotionally-driven drafting and could be a useful tool in public protection. It is 
accordingly submitted that New Zealand should implement a non-public register, which 
could have a positive effect on the prevention, investigation and dete1Tence of future 
sexual offending. 
176 ln the UK, the cost of'eslablishing a sex offender registry has already cost around 100 million. 
177 Kate Fitch, above n I 33, 43. 
178 In Ca li fo rni a, annual operation co~ ts are $950,000. 
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V NEW ZEALAND- THE FUTURE 
A A non-public register 
Having dete1mined that New Zealand should implement a non-public sex offender 
register, the next question one must ask is: what form should such a register take? 
Important questions include, what information should the register contain? For how long 
should the information be maintained? What offenders will be required to register? When 
and to whom should info1mation be disclosed? In answering these questions, New 
Zealand should draw on the experiences of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 
which have implemented non-public registers , as well as United States jurisdictions, 
which have implemented public registers, adapting the experiences of these other 
jurisdictions to the New Zealand legal environment. The following section outlines the 
characteristics proposed for a New Zealand non-public sex offender register. 
B The characteristics of the proposed non-public register 
1 Offences requiring registration 
One of the main policy arguments explored above for the implementation of a sex 
offender register is the potential protection that a sex offender register could afford the 
public. The controlled release of info1mation concerning sex offenders to individuals that 
are deemed to be at 1isk would allow those individuals to take the necessa1y steps to keep 
themselves safe from potential hann. Based on this reasoning, a logical response is that a 
sex offender register should only be applicable to offences which involve a public 
element, and which expose public citizens to some fonn ofrisk. Yet it is noted that many 
jurisdictions require registration for a wide range of offences extending to those that do 
not place other members of the public at a risk of harm, such as incest and bestiality. 179 
For that reason, it is submitted that the proposed sex offender register should exclude the 
registration ofo ff enders guilty of sexual offences not involving a public element. 
Accordingly, it is proposed that a sex offender register in ew Zealand should 
only be applicable to anyone convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of 
179 See, for example, th e Sexual O fTenccs Act 2003 (U K), th e Sex O ffend er In fo rm a tion Registratio n Ac t 
RS C l 985 c A- I . 
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offences under sections 128- 138 (excluding section 130) of the Crimes A
ct. 180 In contrast 
to the Sex Offender Registry Bill 2003 , the proposed register would not fo
llow the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (UK) by applying to suspected sexual offenders war
ned by police of 
an offence that the suspected offender admits at the time. This is bec
ause, unlike the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand does not have a fom1al system of warnin
g offenders, and 
including offenders warned by police would extend the scope of the 
register too far. 
Finally, the register would not be retrospective, and would only ap
ply to offences 
committed after the implementation of the legislation and to offenders
 still serving an 
active portion of their sentence. 
2 Information contained in the register 
In order to be effective, it is necessary that the register contain su
fficient 
information, not only for the investigation of future offences, but also 
to assist in the 
prevention of future offending. However, while it is important that 
the infonnation 
contained in the register is sufficient to meet its objectives, it is also im
po1tant that the 
infom1ation contained is not excessive. As recognised in United States
' studies, 
181 it is 
important to limit the infonnation incorporated in a register, as excess
ive information 
would consequently require a huge amount of expenditure of time and
 money by the 
government to keep the register up to date. The maintenance of an up-to-
date register is a 
key issue in the efficacy of the register, 
182 however if more money is spent on updating 
paperwork rather than actively investigating and preventing future c
rimes, the very 
purpose of a register could be undem1ined. Accordingly, infonnatio
n pertaining to 
membership in clubs, children living with the offender, travel plans and 
employment (as 
required by English and Canadian registers) should be excluded from 
a New Zealand 
register. The inclusion of this infonnation would impose too much of a bu
rden on a small 
country and police force such as New Zealand. 
180 See A ppendix I for a li st o f th ese offences. Thi s li st inc ludes a ll serious
 sex ual o ffendin g, such as sex ua l 
vio lation, sex ual groo ming and indecent assault, but exc ludes incest and
 be ti a lity. 
181 Kate Fitch, above n 133, 43. 
182 Bill Hebenton and Terry T ho mas, "Keeping T rac k? Observatio ns o n S
ex o ffender reg istries in the US" 
( 1997) Crime Detecti on and Prevention Series, Paper 83, 33. 
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It is proposed that New Zealand's register should contain the following 
info1mation: an offender's name; alias(es); date of birth; address; photograph; 
fingerprints; DNA sample; previous sexual offences; drivers licence; and assessed level 
of risk (revised on a yearly basis). While this infonnation is comprehensive for the 
purposes of the register, it is not excessive and would not be overly time-consuming to 
maintain. The onus would be on offenders to infonn the autho1ities if any of their details 
change, with consequences for non-compliance. 183 Police would have the responsibility 
of confirming an offender's details and re-assessing the offender's level of risk at least 
once a year. 
3 Leng th of time information retained on the register 
Rather than imposing mandatory blanket petiods for info1mation to be kept on the 
register (such as the United States, which requires a minimum of I O years, with some 
States requiring lifetime registration for all offenders), info1mation should be held on the 
register for the maximum imprisonment period an offender could have received for the 
offence if sentenced. 184 This approach is more justifiable, as it would reflect the 
seriousness of the offence, rather than imposing a mandatory period, regardless of the 
gravity of the offending. For this reason, it would also be unjust to require lifetime 
registration for all second convictions. 185 It is therefore submitted that any secondary 
offences be cumulative on the total time an offender remains on the register. 
Upon the expiration of the applicable registration period, and before an o ffender' s 
information is withdrawn, the offender should be subject to a review by police to 
detennine whether the offender still poses any risk to the public . If the offender is 
deemed to continue to pose a risk to society, discretion should be available to maintain 
the offender' s infonnation on the register for an extended period that is deemed 
reasonable and necessa1y . 
183 Consequences fo r non-compliance would be discretionary and in monetary rorm. 
184 This is in accordance w ith the Canad ian ationa l Sex Offender Registry. 
185 Lifetime registra tion fo r second offences is required in certa in jurisdiction of the U nited tales and 
Canada. 
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4 Criteria for disclosure 
Access to infonnation on the register would be limited to the police and any other 
person authorised by the Minister of Justice. However, it is proposed that the police 
should be given discretion to disclose infonnation from the register to ce11ain members of 
the public if an offender is deemed to pose a high risk of ha1m to those individuals. This 
approach is similar to the position taken in various jurisdictions in the United States, 
where the dissemination of infotmation is based on whether an offender is classified as 
having a low, medium or high-level of tisk. 
186 It is suggested for New Zealand that 
info1mation relating to offenders classified as posing a 'low-level' or 'medium-level' of 
risk should be available only to the police and other authorised persons. Information 
concerning offenders classified as 'high-risk', however, should be released to school 
authorities and similar organisations, as well as close neighbours considered to be at risk 
ofhann. 
It is suggested that the disclosure of info1mation to certain individuals based on an 
assessment of risk would be a more effective and justifiable method than that under the 
police Criminal Profiling Guidelines today. First, under the cmrent Guidelines, 
information cannot be disclosed solely on the basis that an offender poses a danger to 
members of society. Instead, the Guidelines require that an offender is involved in active, 
persistent offending. Under the proposed register, information could be disclosed if an 
offender was deemed to pose a 'high-tisk' to society. This is a more effective method of 
protecting the public. Secondly, when infotmation is disclosed, it would only be to 
ce11ain individuals deemed to be at risk of harm from the 'high-risk' offender, rather than 
to the wider community, minimising the publicity given to that infotmation, and ensuring 
that an offender's right to ptivacy is not unjustifiably breached. This would provide for a 
more justifiable method of disclosing the information. 
VII PROPOSED NON-PUBLIC REGISTER AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
In order to determine whether the proposed register would survive a challenge 
that it was in breach of the tort of privacy in New Zealand, it is necessary to undergo an 
186 " Keep ing Track? Observa tions on Sex o ffe nder registries in the US", above n 182, 28-9. 
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analysis of the to1t of privacy in relation to the disclosure of sex offender info1mation 
under the proposed register. The next section provides an example of the tort of breach of 
privacy applied to the disclosure of sex offender information under the cmTent police 
Criminal Profiling Guidelines, followed by an analysis of the tort of breach of privacy 
applied to disclosure of info1mation under the proposed register. 
A The tort of breach of privacy applied to the Criminal Profiling Guidelines 
The tort of breach of privacy was recently applied in relation to the publication of 
info1mation relating to a sex offender in the case of Brown v Attorney-General. 187 Brown, 
a convicted paedophile, was on parole living in a suburban community. The police, 
believing Brown was likely to re-offend, circulated a flier around his neighbourhood 
identifying Brown as a convicted paedophile, containing his photograph, name and 
address. As a result, Brown was harassed and assaulted. He brought a claim against the 
police under the tort of breach of privacy. 
The District Court held that Brown had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
info1mation released, and that the publicity given to that information would have been 
highly offensive to a reasonable person. 188 Relevant factors contributing to this decision 
included the fact that the photograph of Brown was taken without his consent for the 
purposes in which it was used and that he did not anticipate this infonnation being 
disclosed, the sensationalised manner and wide audience to which the flier was released, 
and the breach of the Criminal Profiling Guidelines by the police, as the information was 
"obtained as a result of otherwise legitimate police work". 189 The Coutt accordingly held 
that there had been an unreasonable breach of Brown's right to privacy and awarded 
Brown $25,000 in damages. 190 
Although Brown stands as authority for the proposition that the dissemination of 
an offender's personal information in the pursuit of public protection may constitute an 
187 Brown v Attorney-General, above n 7. 
188 Ibid , paras 74 , 7 5 and 97 Judge Spear. 
189 Ibid, para 75 Judge Spear. 
190 Ibid , para l 06 Judge Spear. 
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unjustifiable breach of privacy, it should be noted that the decision to award damages in 
Brown was largely due to the circumstances in which the information was obtained and 
disseminated. It is submitted that the circumstances in Brown can be differentiated from a 
situation where infonnation is lawfully obtained and only disclosed to certain members of 
the public through a non-public register. One must also note that Brown is a decision of 
the District Coutt and therefore does not constitute binding precedent for future decisions 
of higher courts. 
B The tort of breach of privacy applied to the proposed register 
In order to dete1mine whether disclosure of an offender's information under the 
proposed non-public register would amount to a breach of the tort of privacy, an 
evaluation of each element of the t01t will be undertaken. As previously mentioned, 
according to the Hosking majority, the elements that must be established in order to 
satisfy a breach of the to1t of privacy are:
191 
(1) The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of 
p1ivacy; and 
(2) Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person. 
Even if these two elements are established, publication will not constitute a breach if the 
defendant can prove that there is a legitimate public concern in the information. 
192 
1 Reasonable expectation of privacy in the information? 
While some matters are inherently private (such as personal and family affairs), 
and some matters are inherently public (such as the ownership of land), 
193 the distinction 
is not always simple to draw. As Gleeson CJ stated in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, 
"there is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is not. "
194 
His Honour proposed that in order to detennine the privacy interest in facts that are not 
inherently obvious, one must apply "contempora1y standards of morals and 
19 1 Hosking v Runting, above n 25, para 117 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
192 Ibid, para 129 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
191 E Paton-Simpson , "Invasion of privacy by the publication of private facts" ( 1998) MLR 318.
 
194 ABC v Lena Ii Game Al eats Pty Ltd, above n 96. 
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behaviours". 195 Thus, for each piece of information that would be disclosed under the 
proposed register, an analysis will be undertaken of whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information according to contemporary standards of morals 
and behaviours. 
(a) Is an address considered a private fact? 
As evidenced by the case of Regina v Holman, info1mation that is considered 
merely 'factual and desc1iptive in nature' traditionally does not attract a high degree of 
expectation of privacy. 196 In that case, the Court declined to uphold the applicant's claim 
that requiring a person to complete a census form was a breach of their rights. Similarly, 
Ame1ican com1s have declared that no privacy interest exists in respect of an individual's 
residential address 197 because this info1mation is readily available in public records such 
as telephone books and electoral registers. 198 
While in Brown, Judge Spear noted that Brown "unquestionably" had a 
reasonable expectation of p1ivacy in his residential information, 199 this statement was 
based on the finding that the infonnation was "obtained as a result of otherwise legitimate 
police work" and the fact that Brown did not anticipate this info1mation being disclosed 
to the public. 200 Arguably then, the reasoning in Brown would not be applicable to 
situations in which offenders were required to surrender their information for the 
purposes of a register pursuant to an Act of Parliament, knowing that the information 
may be disclosed to ce11ain members of the public if the offender is considered to be at 
risk. The infonnation would therefore be obtained through legitimate means and 
offenders would anticipate that their infonnation would be disclosed . If info1mation was 
obtained in this manner, it is likely that courts would follow the Ame1ican precedent and 
find that offenders would not be able to claim a reasonable expectation of p1ivacy in their 
residential information. 
195 fbid. 
196 Regina v Holman (1982) 28 CR (3d) 378. 
197 Russell 11 Gregoire, (1997) 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9tl1 Cir) . 
198 Doe v Poritz, ( 1995) 142 N.J. I , 662 A. 2d 367, 409. 
199 Brown v Attorney-General, above n 7, para 75 Judge Spear. 
200 Ibid . 
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(b) Are criminal convictions a private fact? 
Judge Spear in Brown detennined that there was not a reasonable 
expectation of 
p1ivacy in relation to the conviction in that case, as it was c
onsidered to be public 
infonnation, given that sentencing had occuITed only three and
 a half years earlier. 
201 
This result accords with the prominence given to open justice 
in New Zealand, which 
means that recent convictions will most likely be public info1ma
tion. This indicates that 
an offender should not be able to claim a reasonable expecta
tion of privacy in such 
information. Indeed , it has been argued that there is no reasonab
le expectation in respect 
of convictions at all, given that such infonnation is a matter o
f public record.
202 Yet, 
although such information may be publicly accessible in theory
, court records in New 
Zealand will only be available from the register where the hearin
g took place and access 
will not be granted without a "genuine and proper reason" . 
203 This suggests that the 
p1inciple of open justice should not automatically negate an
 offender's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their convictions. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that even if convictions were once
 public facts, an 
expectation of p1ivacy can attach to the info1mation regarding con
viction after a period of 
time.204 In Tucker v News Media Ownership, McGechan J held tha
t the plaintiff did have 
a reasonable expectation of p1ivacy over past convictions, inc
luding his most recent 
conviction, which had occuITed four years prior to publication.
205 The notion that public 
information can become private over time is also explicitly recogn
ised by p1inciple (ii) of 
the Broadcasting Standai·ds Autho1ity Privacy Principles
206 and affirmed by the decision 
in TV3 Network Services v BSA. 
207 In accordance with these authorities, whether an 
offender has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cri
minal convictions may 
depend on how long ago the offending occun-ed. 
20 1 Ibid , para · 68, 7 1 and 75 Judge Spea r. 
202 Cox Broadcasting Co v Cohn , above n 65,487. See also: Restatem
ent of the La w o_(Torts 1977, above n 
59, 384; "The Right to Privacy", above n 28, 216. 
203 Lemin , above n 34, 9. 
204 Briscoe v Readers Digest Association ( 1971) 483 P 2d 34, 4 l. 
205 Tu cker v News Media OH·nership Ltd, above n J 7, 737 McGechan J. 
206 Broadcas ting Standards Authority http ://www.bsa.govt.nz (access
ed JO June 2008) . 
207 TV3 Network Se,vices v BSA [1995] 2 NZLR 720, 726-728 Eichelb
aum CJ. 
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(c) Does compilation of information give rise to a greater expectation of privacy? 
It has been argued that an expectation of privacy can be raised by a compilation of 
publicly available info1mation into a single source. 208 The proposed register would 
compile information such as: an offender's name; alias; date of birth; address; 
photograph; previous convictions; d1ivers licence number; fingerprints; and DNA. It is 
therefore necessary to dete1mine whether an offender would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the compilation of the above information on a register. 
However, one must note that while the register does compile all of the above information, 
only an offender's name, photograph, address and previous convictions would potentially 
be released to the public. The question, then, is whether a privacy interest is created by 
the compilation and dissemination of an offender's name, photograph, residential address 
and previous convictions in one document. 
While an expectation of privacy in the compilation of info1mation has been 
claimed on numerous occasions, such a right has never been recognised by American 
courts. This is evidenced by the case of Doe v Portiz , in which it was held that a 
compilation of public information would not be afforded the same protection as private 
info1mation, merely on the basis that it is compiled into a single source .2°9 In that case, a 
convicted sex offender brought a claim against the State of New Jersey, claiming that, 
among other things, the registration and dissemination of his info1mation under a register 
breached his right to privacy. The Com1 refused to uphold the offender's privacy rights, 
stating that the infonnation was not deserving of a particularly high degree of protection, 
and public policy interests in the disclosure of the info1mation outweighed any rights to 
privacy.210 This is a sensible outcome and it is therefore submitted that it is unlikely that 
any additional protection would be offered to a compilation of info1mation by the New 
Zealand cou11s. 
208 Doe v Poritz, above n 198, 4 l 0. 
209 Ibid , 410. 
2 10 Ibid , 41 2. The public policy interests in the disc losure o f the in fo rmation included the danger o f 
rec idi vism o f sex ua l o ffenders and the State interest in protecting the sa fety of the members of the public. 
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(d) Conclusion- reasonable expectation of privacy in the information? 
From the discussion above, it is unlikely that offenders could claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their name, address or photograph if there was legislation in 
force requiiing that such infonnation be sunendered upon conviction, for the purposes of 
a sex offender register. This is because the infotmation would be lawfully obtained, and 
offenders would recognise that the infonnation may be released to ce1tain members of the 
public if they were deemed to be a risk to society. While details of an offender's previous 
criminal convictions may entail a reasonable expectation of privacy, this obstacle could 
be overcome by siinply not releasing the details of an offender's specific criminal 
convictions. The same goals would still be achieved by merely stating that the offender 
poses a risk to the public. 
As a consequence of the above discussion, the initial element of the to1t of 
privacy would not be breached by the dissemination of infomrntion from the proposed 
non-public register to ce1tain members of society, as offenders would not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the info1mation. In reality this ends the inquiry, as 
both elements of the tort must be fulfilled. However, the remaining elements of the to1t of 
breach of privacy will be analysed in the interests of completeness. 
2 Would disclosure be highly offensive to the reasonable person? 
In P v D, the Cou1t established that whether disclosure is 'highly offensive' is to 
be determined from the perspective of an objective reasonable person in the shoes of the 
claimant.2
11 What is required is a public disclosure that is truly haimful , distressing or 
humiliating. 
212 Thus, it is necessai·y to consider whether a reasonable person in the 
claimant's shoes would find it highly offensive to have infotmation pe1taining to his or 
her conviction and other personal details such as his or her naine, photograph and address 
distributed publicly. Clearly any individual, no matter what his or her history, would find 
it harmful, distress ing and humiliating to have such information released. Arguably, the 
211 P v D, above n 40 , para 34 Nicholson J. 
2 12 Ibid . 
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distress would be particularly acute for offenders who have completed their punishment 
and are attempting to reintegrate themselves back into the community. 
A counter argument is that offenders have less of an expectation of privacy than 
other members of the public, consequently rendering disclosure of their information less 
offensive than others. American courts have attributed different privacy expectations to 
offenders, with some courts labelling offenders' privacy rights as "significant" or 
"impo11ant'' and others labelling their rights as "relatively modest" or "minimal" .2 13 New 
Zealand courts, on the other hand, accept that whether disclosure is considered offensive 
is coloured by the degree of an individual's expectation of privacy.2 14 In accordance with 
this principle, it could be argued that once offenders have been warned of the fact that 
their personal information could be disclosed under the proposed register, they have less 
of an expectation of p1ivacy and should consequently find the dissemination of such 
information less offensive. 
Fm1hermore, in determining whether publication of info1mation is highly 
offensive, it is not the nature of the information that is in question, but whether the 
publicity given to that information is highly offensive. 2 15 Thus, the extent of the 
publication is relevant in dete1mining whether disclosure of the info1mation is considered 
highly offensive. This is illustrated in the case of Hosking, where it was held that p1ivacy 
would only be protected if there was widespread publicity of the information.2 16 
According to these considerations, it is unlikely that information disclosed under 
the proposed non-public register would be given sufficient publicity to be considered 
highly offensive. Information would be selectively disclosed to ce11ain members of the 
public considered at risk, based on an assessment of the risk of harm the offender posed 
to society. Judge Spear in Brown stated that the flier's "overall effect" was the subject of 
determination. 2 17 In that case, considerations such as the large audience and 
213 Doe v Poritz, above n I 98, 57. 
214 Hosking v Runting, above n 25, para 256 Tipping J. 
215 Hosking v Runting, above n 25, pa ra 11 7 Gault P and Bl anchard J.. 
2 16 P v D, above no 40,60 1 Nicholson J. 
2 17 See Brol\ln v Attorney-Genera /, above n 7, para 59 Judge Spear. 
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sensationalised manner in which the flier was distributed contributed to the finding that 
the disclosure would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person. However, if 
infornrntion is disseminated in a controlled fashion, in a non-sensationalised manner and 
only when deemed necessary, it is unlikely that such dissemination would breach the 
Brown threshold. 
3 Public interest in disclosure 
Even if the elements of the tort of privacy are satisfied, liability will not result if 
the defendant proves , on the balance of probabilities , that the infornrntion disclosed is a 
matter of legitimate public interest.
21 8 As recognised in Hosking, the extent of any right to 
freedom of expression in a publication is directly linked to the extent of any demonstrable 
legitimate public concern in the infonnation publicised.
2 19 The public interest element 
therefore ensures that the right to ptivacy is not excessively intrnsive on the public's right 
to freedom of expression, by requiring a balancing exercise between the two competing 
rights. 
When balancing freedom of expression and pnvacy interests, a proportional 
approach must be taken. That is, the extent of the publication must be propo1tional to the 
identified public interest.
220 The greater the invasion of privacy, the greater the level of 
legitimate public concern must be for the defence to be successful.
22 1 The case of Brown 
is an example of a court applying the propo1tionality approach. In Brown it was held that 
there was some public interest in the info1rnation, but that the extent of publication went 
beyond any legitimate public interest.
222 
In accordance with the above authorities, to rely on a legitimate public interest 
defence, the disclosure of sex offender info1mation must be propo11ionate to any 
legitimate public concern in the info1rnation. Consequently, the dissemination must be to 
a limited , concerned audience, with only the approp1iatc info1rnation being disclosed , and 
2 18 flosking v Runting, above n 25, para 129 Gault P and Blanchard JJ. 
zi9 Ibid , para 132 Gault P and Blanchal'd J. 
220 ]bid, para 132 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
22 1 [bid, para 132 Gau lt and Blanchard JJ . 
222 Brown 1• Attorney-Genera/, above n 7, para 93 Judge Spear. 
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not in a sensationalised manner. ln this way, the public's 1ight to freedom of expression 
and safety is promoted, as the members of the public deemed to be at risk are being 
infonned of information of concern to them, whilst an offender's right to privacy is only 
being limited in so far as it is necessary to protect the public and ensure their right to 
freedom of information. If disclosure under the proposed register is in accordance with 
these criteria, it is likely that, should such disclosure breach an offender's right to 
privacy, liability would not result as the disclosure would be consistent with legitimate 
public concern. 
Finally, one must note that while public interest provides a defence for disclosure, 
mere public curiosity will not be sufficient.223 As the Court recognised in Hosking, there 
is a difference between 'public interest ' and mere 'public curiosity'. 224 Thus, in justifying 
disclosure of infonnation from the proposed register, it must be shown that the recipients 
of the information have a legitimate interest in this information, rather than merely a 
cu1iosity. Hence, while sexual offending will undoubtedly be a matter of public curiosity, 
this is not a sufficient concern to satisfy the public interest defence . Despite these 
concerns, it is unlikely that this distinction will prove fatal in relation to disclosure under 
the proposed register, as sexual offending and protection of the public from such offences 
is unquestionably a legitimate public matter, rather than a matter of mere public curiosity. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
When a child sexually abused, undoubtedly, one's initial reaction 1s that 
something must be done to prevent such a tragedy from occurring again. Arguably, by 
valuing a sexual offender's right to privacy over freedom of expression and public 
protection, the government is currently not doing enough to fwther the investigation, 
prevention and deterrence of future offending. However, one must ask whether the 
implementation of a sex offender register is the best way of achieving these goals. This 
paper has set out to demonstrate that, although the implementation of a public register 
may result in more harm than good, a non-public register could indeed be an effective 
223 Hosking v Run ting, above n 25 , paras l JJ-134 Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
224 Ibid. 
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solution in the investigation, prevention and deterrence of future offending. Although this 
option was rejected by Parlian1ent in 2003, it is submitted that this was due to 
deficiencies in the Sex Offenders Registiy Bill itself, and that a register with similar 
characte1istics as that proposed in this paper would remedy the deficiencies of the 2003 
Bill. 
Despite initial concerns surrounding the competing 1ights to freedom of 
expression and p1ivacy, an examination of other jmisdictions has shown that a sex 
offender register can survive in the face of the competing rights, and indeed this paper 
has shown that a balance between both rights can be advanced by the selective disclosure 
of infonnation to members of the public considered at risk in New Zealand. By only 
allowing for minimal selective disclosure, an offender's right to p1ivacy would not be 
unjustifiably breached, and individuals at risk would be afforded their 1ight to 
information and protection. 
The impact of sexual offending is both substantial and oppressive,
225 and since 
1985, offences of rape have been increasing by approximately 11 per cent per annum.
226 
Solutions are required to address such a serious threat to society sooner rather than later. 
While disclosure is already provided for by the police Criminal Profiling Guidelines, the 
register proposed in this paper would provide for more effective and justifiable disclosure 
in statuto1y fo1m, as it would allow for disclosure based on an assessment of risk, rather 
than persistent offending, and promote a consistent approach that fairly balances the 
rights to freedom of expression and privacy. The compilation of infonnation under the 
proposed register would also be of substantial benefit to the police for the investigation 
and detection of future offences, as all relevant information about sexual offenders would 
be in one source. Introducing legislation to implement a sex offender register would also 
give Parlian1ent a chance to debate the subject and bring the matter to public attention. 
With these comments in mind , perhaps a well-drafted, empirically-based piece of 
legislation introduced to Parliament could next time be met with a different response. 
225 "Keeping Track? Observations on Sex o ffender registries in the US", above n 182, 2. 
226 Ibid , 1. 
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IX APPENDIX 1-STATUTORY SECTIONS OF THE CRIMES ACT 1961 
128 Sexual violation defined 
( 1) Sexual violation is the act of a person who-
( a) rapes another person; or 
(b) has unlawful sexual connection with another person. 
128A Allowing sexual activity does not amount to consent in some circumstances 
(1) A person does not consent to sexual activity just because he or she does not 
protest or offer physical resistance to the activity. 
128B Sexual violation 
(1) Every one who commits sexual violation is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 20 years. 
129 Attempted sexual violation and assault with intent to commit sexual violation 
(1) Every one who attempts to commit sexual violation is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 10 years. 
129 A Sexual conduct with consent induced by certain threats 
( 1) Every one who has sexual connection with another person knowing that the other 
person has been induced to consent to the connection by threat is liable to 
imprisonment for a te1m not exceeding 14 years. 
131 Sexual conduct with dependent family member 
(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a te1m not exceeding 7 years who has 
sexual connection with a dependent family member under the age of 18 years. 
(2) Every one is liable to imp1isonment for a te1m not exceeding 7 years who 
attempts to have sexual connection with a dependent family member under the 
age of 18 years. 
(3) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a te,m not exceeding 3 years who does an 
indecent act on a dependent family member under the age of 18 years. 
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131B Meeting young person under 16 following sexual grooming, etc 
(1) Every person is liable to imprisonment for a tenn not exceeding 7 years if,-
(a) having met or communicated with a person under the age of 16 years (the young 
person) on an earlier occasion, he or she takes one of the following actions: 
(i) intentionally meets the young person: 
(ii) travels with the intention of meeting the young person: 
(iii) arranges for or persuades the YP to travel with the intention of meeting him; 
132 Sexual conduct with child under 12 
(1) Every one who has sexual connection with a child is liable to imprisonment for a 
tenn not exceeding 14 years. 
(2) Every one who attempts to have sexual connection with a child 1s liable to 
imprisonment for a tenn not exceeding l O years. 
(3) Every one who does an indecent act on a child is liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 10 years. 
134 Sexual conduct with young person under 16 
(1) Every one who has sexual connection with a young person 1s liable to 
imprisonment for a tenn not exceeding 10 years. 
(2) Every one who attempts to have sexual connection with a young person is liable 
to imprisonment for a tenn not exceeding l O years. 
(3) Every one who does an indecent act on a young person is liable to imprisonment 
for a tenn not exceeding 7 years. 
13 5 Indecent assault 
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a tem1 not exceeding 7 years who 
indecently assaults another person. 
138 Sexual exploitation of person with significant impairment 
(I) Every one is liable lo imprisonment for a tem1 not exceeding 10 yea!'S who has 
exploitative sexual connection with a person with a significant impai1ment. 
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